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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
VINCENT MENDEZ, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Department of Social Services, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 900151-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal from a final order of the district court 
granting the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
The district court reviewed the informal adjudicative proceedings 
of the State of Utah, Department of Social Services pursuant to 
the plaintiff's complaint. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(b) (1990). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The only issue on appeal is whether estoppel may be raised 
as a defense in an action by the Office of Recovery Services to 
recover the value of food stamps issued in error to a recipient 
when the overissuance was caused by agency error. The correction 
of error standard is the proper standard of appellate review in 
this case since the court is reviewing the district court's 
ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 3erube v. 
Fashion Centre Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1039 (Utah, 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
AND REGULATIONS 
U.S. Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary not-withstanding. 
Utah Code Annotated §55-15a-24(l)(a), (4) (1953, as 
amended): 
(1) Any person who engages in any of the following 
acts shall be liable to the state of Utah for the value 
of all funds or other benefits received by any person 
as a result of those acts: 
a) receiving assistance payments, medical 
services, food stamps or any other thing of value 
under the provisions of this chapter, to which 
they were not entitled; 
(4) The liability to the state set forth in this 
chapter shall arise whether the acts engaged in were 
due to the fraud, mistake or administrative or factual 
error, intentional or unintentional, of any party. 
Utah Code Annotated §62A-9-129(1)(a), (4) (1988): 
(1) Any person who engages in any of the following 
acts is liable to this state for the value of all funds 
or other benefits received by any person as a result of 
those acts: 
(a) receiving public assistance, medical 
benefits, or any other thing of value, under the 
provisions of this chapter, to which he was not 
entitled; 
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(4) The liability to this state set forth in this 
chapter arises whether the acts engaged in were due to 
the fraud, mistake, or administrative or factual error, 
intentional or unintentional, of any party. 
Utah Code Annotated §68-3-2 (1953, as amended): 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation 
thereof are to be strictly construed has no application 
to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish 
the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which 
they relate, and their provisions and all proceedings 
under them are to be liberally construed with a view to 
effect the objects of the statutes and to promote 
justice. Whenever there is any variance between the 
rules of equity and the rules of common law in 
reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall 
prevail. 
7 C.F.R. §273.18 (1990) 
(See addendum) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah, Department of Social Services agrees with 
Mr. Mendez' statement concerning the nature of the case, the 
course of proceedings, disposition in the court below, and, for 
purposes of this appeal only, the statement of facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah law and federal regulations mandate that the Office of 
Recovery Services (ORS) recover all overpayments of food stamps 
which are the result of administrative error. ORS has no 
discretion regarding the recovery of overpayments of food stamps 
except where specifically allowed by regulation. The federal 
regulations specifically allow some defenses to recovery of 
overpayments but do not allow states to recognize the defense of 
equitable estoppel. With the exception of one or two lower 
-3-
courts in states that do not have the same statutory scheme as 
Utah, it has never been found that equitable estoppel should bar 
the recovery of food stamp overpayments. 
Equitable estoppel cannot be used to circumvent a statutory 
mandate. State legislation mandates recovery of food stamp 
overpayments even where the overpayment is caused by agency 
error. Where a legal right or obligation exists, equity cannot 
circumscribe that right. The clear wording of the Utah statute 
requiring liability for overpayments precludes the use of 
equitable defenses. 
The nature of the equitable estoppel defense and its 
elements are inconsistent with Utah law and the federal 
regulations. The necessary elements of equitable estoppel are 
not present in food stamp overpayment cases. 
Allowing equitable estoppel in this statutory and regulatory 
setting would violate the supremacy clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. Preventing recovery of food stamp overpayments by 
equitable estoppel would diminish the pool of resources intended 
for those who are substantively eligible for the benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW REQUIRING COLLECTION OF OVERPAYMENTS 
OF FOOD STAMPS DOES NOT ALLOW CONSIDERATION OF EQUITABLE DEFENSES 
A. The Office of Recovery Services is required by Utah 
law and by federal regulations to establish a claim 
against Mr. Mendez for the collection of the over-
issuance of food stamps he received. 
Under Utah law, the Office of Recovery Services, which is a 
subdivision of the Department of Social Services, has a statutory 
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duty to "recover public assistance provided to persons for which 
they were ineligible . . . and to cooperate with the federal 
government in programs designed to recover health and social 
service funds." Utah Code Annotated §62A-11-104. It cannot be 
disputed that cooperating with the federal government includes 
complying with federal regulations pertinent to the 
administration of the food stamp program. The regulations 
specifically say: 
The State agency shall establish a claim against any 
household that has received more food stamp benefits 
than it is entitled to receive or any household which 
contains an adult member who was an adult member of 
another household that received more food stamp 
benefits than it was entitled to receive. 
7 CFR §273.18(a) (emphasis added). It is not disputed that Mr. 
Mendez received more food stamps than he was entitled to receive|. 
Therefore, in order for the Office of Recovery Services to comply 
with federal regulations, it must establish a claim against Mr. 
Mendez. 
B. The establishment of a claim for the recovery of an 
overissuance of food stamps is mandatory even when the 
overissuance is the result of administrative error. 
Federal regulations state, "The State agency [ORS] shall 
take action to establish a claim against any household that 
received an overissuance due to . . . administrative error if the 
criteria specified in this paragraph [relating to time periods of 
collection] have been met." 7 CFR §273.18(b). The regulations 
give specific examples of what could be considered administrative 
error: 
(2) Instances of administrative error which may 
result in a claim include but are not limited to the 
following: 
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(i) A State agency failed to take prompt 
action on a change reported by the household; 
(ii) A State agency incorrectly computed the 
household's income or deductions, or otherwise 
assigned an incorrect allotment; 
(v) The State agency failed to provide a 
household a reduced level of food stamp benefits 
because its public assistance grant changed. 
(iv) An agency of the State or local 
government took an action or failed to take an 
appropriate action, which resulted in the 
household improperly receiving public assistance. 
7 CFR §273.18(b)(2). Any or all of the above examples could 
accurately describe Mr. Mendez' case. ORS is, therefore, 
required to establish a claim against food stamp recipients in 
Mr. Mendez' situation. 
C. ORS has no discretion whatsoever regarding the 
recovery of food stamp overpayments. 
Mr. Mendez argues that the state agency may use its own 
discretion in deciding whether to collect overpayments and that 
estoppel is therefore a proper consideration. In support of that 
argument, he refers to Section 62A-11-110 of the Utah Code, which 
specifically grants the agency discretion in recovering small 
overpayments. He also refers to the overpayment case of Utah ORS 
v. Westfall, Case No. 60195145R2 (June 26, 1990) where the state 
dismissed a claim after considerable litigation. 
Mr. Mendez' argument in this regard is clearly misplaced. 
The discretion granted by the legislature to not recover small 
administrative error overpayments is allowed purely for financial 
reasons. Those who drafted the federal regulations realized that 
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is would not make sense to require the state agencies to spend a 
great deal of money to collect a small debt so they allowed some 
discretion in that area. See CFR 273.18(e)(1). Section 62A-11-
110 is the state's statutory response to the regulatory 
guidelines. ORS is allowed to exercise discretion in recovering 
small overpayments so that limited welfare resources may be spei^ t 
on the needy rather than wasted in fruitless collection efforts, 
Mr. Mendez also points to the administrative overpayment 
case of Utah ORS v. Westfall, case no. 60195145R2 (June 26, 1990) 
for the proposition that the state agency has broad discretion in 
deciding whether to collect overpayments. In that case, the 
state dismissed an overpayment claim against the defendant. 
Counsel for Mr. Mendez in this case also represented the 
defendant in that case. He was successful over the state's 
objections in having a default judgment set aside concerning an 
overpayment that was many years old. The basis for the 
overpayment claim was that the welfare recipient had allegedly 
withheld information concerning her household which would have 
made her ineligible for benefits. By the time the default was 
set aside, all evidence necessary to prove ineligibility for 
benefits was no longer available. Since it was impossible for 
the state to prove an overpayment ever existed, the case was 
dismissed. It was not dismissed for discretionary reasons as Mrj 
Mendez would lead the court to believe. With Mr. Mendez, the 
fact of the overpayment is undisputed. In Westfall, no 
overpayment could be proved. 
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In Childs v. Essex County Division of Welfare, 564 A.2d 889 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988), a person charged with a welfare 
overpayment was held liable to repay the benefits received in 
error. In making its determination, the court noted that the 
agency had no discretion but is required to recover all 
overpayments of public assistance: 
CWA [County Welfare Agency] has no discretion 
whatsoever with regard to seeking recovery of 
overpayments of public assistance funds or over-
issuances of food coupons. The foregoing recovery 
provisions are mandatory. Under the AFDC program, 
federal financial participation can be jeopardized for 
failure of states diligently to seek recovery of monies 
paid out in excess of what is mandated. 45 C.F.R §205. 
Similarly, under the totally federally-funded food 
stamp program, states are subject to severe sanctions, 
not merely state reduction of participation in the 
program, but state liability for overissuance of 
coupons, should a state fail to recover or make good 
faith efforts to recover. 7 C.F.R. §§ 275, 276. 
Id. at 896. ORS has no discretion but must recover food stamps 
issued to those who are not eligible. 
P. The federal regulations have provided exceptions to 
this mandate and equitable estoppel is not included. 
The federal regulations allow some exceptions to the mandate 
requiring state agencies to recover all overpayments of public 
assistance. 7 C.F.R. §273.18(b)(3) states: 
(3) Neither an administrative error claim nor an 
inadvertent household error claim shall be established 
if an overissuance occurred as a result of the 
following: 
(i) A State agency failed to insure that a 
household fulfilled the following procedural 
requirements: 
(A) Signed the application form, 
(B) Completed a current work registration form, 
or 
(C) Was certified in the correct project area; 
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(ii) The household transacted an expired ATP, 
unless the household altered its ATP. 
7 C.F.R. §273.18 (b)(3). All of the above exceptions relate to 
procedural deficiencies that result in overpayments. There are 
no exceptions for cases like Mr. Mendez' where the recipient is 
substantively ineligible. 
Failure of the lawmakers to include an "equitable" exception 
to recovery of administrative overpayments while specifically 
providing other exceptions clearly indicates that they did not 
intend to make the equitable estoppel defense available. This ii 
consistent with a policy of insuring that limited public benefit^ 
are available for those who have the actual need for them as 
opposed to allowing someone to enjoy a windfall benefit because 
the agency erred. 
The courts have generally been sensitive to the procedural/ 
substantive distinction when dealing with public benefits cases. 
For example, Mr. Mendez relies on Lentz v. McMahon, 49 Cal.3d 
393, 777 P.2d 83, 261 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1989) where the court 
determined that estoppel can be asserted against government in 
welfare cases. However, in Lentz, welfare recipients were found 
ineligible for benefits received due to a procedural deficiency 
caused by the state agency. The court determined that the state 
should be estopped from denying benefits in that case but found 
that if the recipient had been substantively ineligible, the 
result might have been much different. It stated: 
[Ejstoppel against a welfare agency may be appropriate 
when, as in Canfield . . . a government agent has 
negligently or intentionally caused a claimant to fail 
to comply with a procedural precondition to 
eligibility, and the failure to invoke estoppel would 
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cause great hardship to + h& claimant. A more difficult 
question is posedf however, when estoppel is asserted 
against the government to defeat substantive 
limitations on eligibility for public benefits. To bar 
recoupment of benefits from a person whose 
circumstances did not qualify him for such benefits 
under applicable substantive eligibility rules might 
amount to a bestowal of benefits not contemplated by 
the Legislature. In this regard, we share the United 
States Supreme Court's view that it is "the duty of all 
courts to observe the conditions defined by [the 
legislative branch] for charging the public treasury." 
(Schweiker v. Hansen, supra, 450 U.S. at F.788, 101 S. 
Ct. at 1471) (emphasis in the original). 
Id. at 87. Lentz, therefore, supports the stcite's position rhat 
estoppel should not bar recovery of overpayments from recipients 
who were not substantively eligible for the benefits. The 
procedural/substantive eligibility distinction also distinguishes 
other cases relied on by Mr. Mendez. Glover v. Adult and Family 
Services Division 613 P.2d 495 (Or. App. 1980) (Benefits 
disallowed because invoices lacked the required signatures). 
Filipo v. Chang, 618 P.2d 295 (Haw. 1980) and Canfield v. Prod, 
67 Cal. App. 3d 722, 137 Cal. Rep. 27 (1977). In fact, when 
actually faced with cases similar to Mr. Mendez', the Oregon and 
Hawaiian courts have refused to stop recoupment of benefits when 
estoppel was raised as a defense. Thrift v. Adult and Family 
Services Division 646 P.2d 1358 (Or. App., 1982) and Cudal v. 
Sunn 742 P.2d 352 (Haw. 1987). 
POINT II 
ESTOPPEL CANNOT BE USED TO NULLIFY THE STATE'S STATUTORY 
MANDATE TO RECOVER FOOD STAMP OVERPAYMENTS 
As noted above, Utah law and federal regulations mandate 
that ORS recover the overissuance of food stamps received by Mr. 
Mendez. The Utah legislature spoke clearly when it stated: 
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(1) Any person who engages in any of the 
following acts is liable to this state for the value of 
all funds or other benefits received by any person as 
a result of those acts . . . 
(b) cashing checks, using food stamps, or 
using medical cards which do not belong to that 
person, without proper authority, or without being 
entitled to the benefits thereunder: . . . 
(4) the liability to this state set forth in this 
chapter arises whether the acts engaged in were due to 
the fraud, mistake or administrative or factual error, 
intentional or unintentional, of any party. 
Utah Code Annotated §62A-9-129 (emphasis added). This statute 
was enacted in January, 1988. The overpayment in this case, 
however, occurred prior to that time. At that time, the 
applicable statute was Utah Code Ann, Section 55-15a-24, which 
states: 
(1) Any person who engages in any of the 
following acts shall be liable to the State of Utah for 
the value of all funds or other benefits received by 
any person as a result of those acts: 
(a) Receiving assistance payments, medical 
services, food stamps, or any other thing of value 
under the provisions of this chapter, to which 
they were not entitled . . . 
(4) The liability to this state set forth in this 
chapter shall arise whether the acts engaged in were 
due to fraud, mistake, or administrative or factual 
error, intentional or unintentional, of any party. 
(Emphasis added). Both of these statutes show the clear intent 
of the legislature that liability for overpayments caused by 
administrative or factual error shall be mandatory. The 
mandatory language of the statute leaves no room for the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel as a defense. If the legislature had 
intended that there be equitable exceptions to liability, it 
could have listed possible exceptions or defenses to liability 
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wiLiun the statute itself, or it could have used permissive terms 
such as "may be liable'1 rather than "shall" be liable. 
It is a fundamental rule of law that statutory law takes 
precedence over and controls common law. In re; Garr's Estate 
31 Utah 57, 68-69, 86P. 757, 761 (1906). The Utah Supreme Court 
spoke on the relationship between common law and statutory law 
when it stated: 
Utah does not follow the rule of the common law that 
statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly 
construed. Rather, the statutes of this state are to 
be "liberally construed with a view to effect the 
objects of the statutes and to promote justice." 
Asay v. Watkins 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah, 1988). See also Utah Code 
Ann. Section 68-3-2 (1953, as amended). 
The Utah Court of Appeals also spoke on this issue when it 
stated: 
In construing this legislation, we must give effect to 
the legislature's underlying intent, American Coal 
Company v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah, 1984), and 
assume that each term in the statute was used 
advisedly. West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 
(Utah, 1982). We will interpret and apply the statute 
according to its literal wording unless it is 
unreasonable, confused or inoperable. Id. ; Home v. 
Home, 737 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah App. , 1987). A proper 
construction of its terms must further the statute's 
purposes. RDG Assocs/Jorman Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n 
741 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah, 1987) 
Gleave v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company 749 P.2d 
660 (Utah App. 1988) . 
Furthermore, "where a legal right is clearly established, 
the equitable doctrine of estoppel cannot be used to circumscribe 
that right." The American National Bank of Denver v. Tina Marie 
Homes, Inc., 476 P.2d 573 (Colo. App. 1970). See also, In re 
Scholtz-Mutual Drug Co., 298 F. 539 (D. Colo. 1924) (A court's 
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"duty to interpret the statute precludes rhe use of its equity 
powers1'); Stevenson v. Burgess, 552 S.W.2d 99, 105 (Tex. 1977) 
("estoppel . . . cannot be invoked to nullify a mandatory 
statutory restriction, especially when such restriction is 
enacted for the benefit of the general public"); Morris v. Morris 
631 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Tex. App. 1982). 
It is true, as pointed out by Mr. Mendez, that equitable 
estoppel has been applied against various government agencies in 
this state. Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control, 602 
P.2d 689 (Utah, 1979), Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 
695 (Utah, 1976), Utah State University v. Sutro and Co., 646 
P.2d 715 (Utah, 1982), and Eldridge v. Utah State Retirement 
Board, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah App. 1990). But the facts of 
each of these cases clearly distinguish them from Mr. Mendez' 
situation. Those cases do not involve agencies disbursing 
federal funds with a federal mandate that errors in disbursement 
be corrected and that overpayments be collected. Nor does their 
result turn on a state statute that imposes liability regardless 
of whether the acts giving rise to the liability where due to 
"administrative or factual error, intentional or unintentional, 
of any party." Utah Code Ann. §55-15a-24(4) (1953, as amended) 
and §62A-9-129(4)(1988). Eldridge v. Utah State Retirement 
Board, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah App. 1990) is the Utah case 
closest factually to Mr. Mendez' situation. There, the court was 
faced with the "anti-estoppel" effect of a state retirement 
statute. But the court did not determine whether the statutory 
mandate had to give way to the doctrine of estoppel because it 
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decided that the "anti-estoppel" statute was inapplicable to the 
facts of that case. Id. at 29. The precise issue involved in Mr. 
Mendez' appeal was avoided 
Furthermore, Eldridqe can be distinguished because the 
court, in accepting the estoppel argument, was influenced by the 
fact that the Retirement Board provides a proprietary function 
rather than a governmental function and therefore, the court did 
not need to be as cautious in applying estoppel against the 
state. Id., at 28. The disbursement of public benefits to Mr. 
Mendez clearly involved a governmental, rather than a 
proprietary, function. 
Since the wording of the state statutes leaves no room for 
exceptions to liability of the recipient of a public assistance 
overpayment, it is clear that the ALJ and the district court were 
correct in refusing to consider the defense of equitable estoppel 
in this case. In fact, had they ignored the legislative mandate 
and applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel, they would have 
abused their judicial discretion by violating the doctrine of 
separation of powers. 
POINT III 
THE EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DEFENSE AND ITS ELEMENTS ARE 
INCONSISTENT WITH UTAH LAW AND THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
(A). Equitable estoppel implies fault to one of the 
parties while Utah law imposes liability upon the 
recipient regardless of fault. 
In order to prevail on the defense of estoppel, it must be 
established that the party to be estopped is at fault. 
Sederquist v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 652 F.Supp. 341, 
347 (D.Nev. 1987); United States v. Georgia Pacific, 421 F.2d 92, 
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97 (9th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Minnesota Department of Public 
Welfare, 268 N.W.2d 906, 910 (Minn. 1985). Mr. Mendez must show 
the agency to be at fault in order for estoppel to succeed. Mr. 
Mendez seeks to estop ORS from collecting the overissuance 
because the administrative agency is at fault. However, under 
Utah law, Mr. Mendez is liable regardless of fault: 
(1) Any person who engages in any of the 
following acts shall be liable to the State of Utah for 
the value of all funds or other benefits received by 
any person as a result of those acts: 
(a) receiving public assistance, medical 
benefits, or any other thing of value, under the 
provisions of the chapter, to which he was not 
entitled; 
(4) The liability to this state set forth in this 
chapter arises whether the acts engaged in were due to 
the fraud, mistake, or administrative or factual error, 
intentional or unintentional, of any party. 
Utah Code Ann. §55-15a-24 (emphasis added) (replaced by §62A-9-
129 in 1988). Mr. Mendez received public assistance in the form 
of food stamps for which he was not entitled. The statute above 
makes no distinction between cases where the recipient is at 
fault or the agency is at fault but treats the issue of fault as 
irrelevant. Estoppel, however, requires that the party to be 
estopped be at fault. The nature of estoppel is therefore, 
inconsistent with the liability imposed by the statute. 
In Castreqon v. Huerta, 119 Ariz 343, 580 P.2d 1197 (1978), 
the appellant was the recipient of General Assistance benefits 
from the Arizona Department of Economic Security. This made the 
recipient ineligible for Supplemental Security Income benefits 
which the recipient began receiving as a result of administrative 
error. By the time the error was discovered, the recipient had 
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been overpaid $565.00. In upholding the ruling of the hearing 
officer, the Supreme Court of Arizona stated, H[W]e think the 
hearing officer could properly conclude that why appellant was 
overpaid was immaterial. . . ." Id. at 1199. Fault is not 
relevant to the liability of the overpaid recipient and 
therefore, considering the defense of estoppel is inappropriate. 
(B) "Silence" can only substitute for an "affirmation 
of fact" when there is a duty to speak. Mere inaction 
on the part of the state does not imply such a duty and 
is not sufficient to invoke estoppel. 
The first element of estoppel is "1) an admission, 
statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards 
asserted." Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah, 1979). In the extant case, 
the agency did not admit, state nor act but simply failed to 
discover the error until three months of overissuance had 
occurred. 
Mr. Mendez, relying on Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 
P.2d 619 (Utah, 1976), contends that the agency's "silence" in 
not informing him of the error (an error the agency had not yet 
discovered) is sufficient to satisfy the first element of 
estoppel. In Morgan, the court stated that silence is sufficient 
to satisfy the first element of estoppel when "he ought to speak, 
intentionally or through culpable negligence. . . ." Id. at 6 95. 
During the three months that Mr. Mendez was overissued the food 
stamps, the state was unaware of the error. Since the state was 
unaware that an error had been committed it would be incorrect to 
assert that the state "ought to have spoken" about something 
which it did not know. Id. at 695. The State obviously did not 
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error "intentionally" and if "culpable negligence" is being 
asserted, then that raises the question of fault again which was 
discussed above. Morgan simply does not apply. "Mere inaction 
by the state is not sufficient to invoke estoppel." Paviokos v. 
Department of Labor, 111 111.2d 257, 489 N.E.2d 1320, 1328 
(1985). Nor will a misunderstanding "support the application of 
equitable estoppel." Anderson v. Commissioner of the Department 
of Human Services, 489 A.2d 1094, 1099 (Me, 1985). The first 
element necessarily fails in cases where recovery of an 
overpayment of public assistance is sought by the state. 
(C) Injury of sufficient gravity must be demonstrated 
if estoppel against the state is to succeed and the 
federal regulations were drafted to avoid such 
detriment. 
The third element of estoppel is "3) injury to such other 
party resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or 
repudiate such admission, statement or act." Celebrity Club, 
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 
1979). The severity of the injury, or detriment, must be 
significantly greater when asserting estoppel against the state. 
In Celebrity Club, the court stated that "estoppel may be applied 
against the state . . . if necessary to prevent manifest 
injustice, and the exercise of governmental powers will not be 
impaired as a result. . . . " Id. In Utah State University v. 
Sutro and Co., 646 P.2d 715 (Utah, 1982), the court stated that 
the general rule is not to apply estoppel against the state and 
that it requires "unusual circumstances, when it is plainly 
apparent that its application would result in injustice, and 
there would be no substantial adverse effect on public policy . . 
. ." Id. at 718. 
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In Cudal v. Sunn, 742 P.2d 352 (Haw. 1987) the Supreme Court 
of Hawaii held that the recovery of an overpayment of public 
assistance does not constitute manifest injustice. Id. at 358. 
There, the plaintiff had been receiving public assistance 
throughout 1984. On September 9, 1984, she moved in with her 
parents which made her ineligible for the amount of public 
assistance she had been receiving. She immediately notified the 
Department of Social Services and Housing (DSSH) and hand 
delivered a letter from her mother verifying the move along with 
receipts of mortgage payments and utility bills paid by her 
parents. The hearing officer found that this put the agency on 
notice. DSSH made no attempt to adjust the benefits nor to 
recover the overpayment. A social worker even told her that the 
move would not effect her AFDC payments. On May 3, 1985, DSSH 
finally informed her that she had been overpaid and that 
repayment action would be taken. 
Mrs. Cudal asserted the defense of equitable estoppel to no 
avail. The court, while finding that generally government can be 
estopped to prevent manifest injustice, held that the 
'•circumstances here to not cry out for an invocation of estoppel 
against the government." Id. at 358. That result was reached 
even without mention of any state "anti-estoppel" statute. 
The prevention of "manifest injustice" is built into the 
federal regulations. When an overissuance of food stamps has 
occurred due to administrative error, the recipient has several 
options for repayment. 7 C.F.R. §273.18(g). The recipient is 
allowed to choose the method of repayment which is most 
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convenient. Id. If the recipient chooses to have his monthly 
allotment reduced, the amount of that payment is to be negotiated 
between the agency and the household and "no household shall have 
its allotment reduced by an amount with which it does not agree 
for payment of an administrative error claim." 7 C.F.R 
§273.18(g)(3). The regulations simply do not allow the type of 
manifest injustice necessary for satisfying the third element of 
estoppel against the state. 
POINT IV 
THE CIRCUMVENTION OF THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS BY THE DEFENSE OF 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL VIOLATES THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND IS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that 
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby. . 
. ." U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. Where both Congress and a 
state assert power in the same area, the state legislation is 
suspended to the extent it frustrates or burdens the federal 
purpose. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977). See 
also Douglas v. Seacoase Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977). In 
the instant case the federal purpose which would be frustrated is 
that of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. The general 
purpose of the Act is to reduce federal spending through budget 
reconciliation as recommended by the specialized committees of 
the United States Congress. See S. Rep. No. 97-139, 97th Cong., 
1st Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & AD. News 396, 
397-98. In reference to the AFDC program, the Senate Committee 
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on Finance stated in its reconciliation recommendation to the 
Committee on the Budget: 
[T]he committee believes that a policy of insuring the 
correctness of payment is crucial if the AFDC program 
is to continue to have public support. By requiring 
the correction of both overpayments and underpayments, 
the committee believers that recipients and welfare 
agencies alike will be encouraged to take greater 
responsibility for assuring the accuracy of 
administration. 
S. Rep at 519, 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 786. Allowing 
the defense of equitable estoppel to circumvent the federal 
regulations which mandate the recovery of food stamp overpayments 
would frustrate the purposes set forth above. In th€* instant 
case, the defense of equitable estoppel is, therefore?, 
unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
While it is true that recovering overpayments from public 
assistance recipients such as Mr. Mendez may work a hardship on 
them, it is also true that they have received a windfall benefit 
to which they are not rightfully entitled. The legislature, in 
requiring recoupment of those overpayments, is merely trying to 
conserve the pool of public funds so that the funds may be 
distributed to those who are properly entitled to receive them. 
The agency clearly recognizes the need to eliminate agency 
errors and is diligently working toward that goal. Allowing the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel as a defense in overpayments cases 
caused by administrative error will not reduce the number of 
agency errors, but will only shift resources away from those who 
would otherwise be entitled to receive them. There is no equity 
or justice to be had in that result. 
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if there is an injustice to Mr. Mendez in this case because 
of the unavailability of the common law defense of equitable 
estoppel, it is an injustice that must be addressed by the 
legislature rather than the courts. In that forumf the hardship 
to the individual can be balanced against the needs of the public 
and the financial reality of limited public assistance resources. 
The decisions of ALJ Mailory and Judge Taylor should be 
affirmed. 
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ADDENDUM 
5273.17 7 CFR Ch. II (1-1-90 Edition) 
fits are being restored, the household 
shall receive the lost benefits as deter-
mined by the State agency pending 
the result* of the fair hearing. If the 
fair hearing decision is favorable to 
the household, the State agency shall 
restore the lost benef Its In accordance 
with that decision. 
(2) If a household believes It is enti-
tled to restoration of lost benefits but 
the State agency, after reviewing the 
case file, does not agree, the house-
hold has 90 days from the date of the 
State agency determination to request 
a fair hearing. The State agency shall 
restore lost benefits to the household 
only if the fair hearing decision is fa-
vorable to the household. Benefits lost 
more than 12 months prior to the date 
the State agency was Initially in-
formed of the household's possible en-
titlement to lost benefits shall not be 
restored. 
(d) Computing the amount to be re-
stored. After correcting the loss for 
future months and excluding those 
months for which benefits may have 
been lost prior to the 12-month time 
limits described In paragraphs (b) and 
(c) of this section, the State agency 
shall calculate the amount to be re-
stored as follows: 
(1) If the household was eligible but 
received an incorrect allotment, the 
loss of benefits shall be calculated 
only for those months the household 
participated. If the loss was caused by 
an Incorrect delay, denial, or termina-
tion of benefits, the months affected 
by the loss shall be calculated as fol-
lows: 
(i) If an eligible household's applica-
tion was erroneously denied, the 
month the loss initially occurred shall 
be the month of application, or for an 
eligible household filing a timely reap-
plication, the month following the ex-
piration of its certification period. (il) If an eligible household's applica-
tion was delayed, the months for 
which benefits may be lost shall be 
calculated In accordance with proce-
dures In | 273.2(h). 
(ill) If a household's benefits were 
erroneously terminated, the month 
the loss Initially occurred shall be the 
first month benefits were not received 
as a result of the erroneous action. 
(lv) After computing the date the 
loss initially occurred, the loss shall be 
calculated for each month subsequent 
to that date until either the first 
month the error Is corrected or the 
first month the household Is found In-
eligible. 
(2) For each month affected by the 
loss, the State agency shall determine 
if the household was actually eligible. 
In cases where there Is no Information 
in the household's case file to docu-
ment that the household was actually 
eligible, the State agency shall advise 
the household of what information 
must be provided to determine eligibil-
ity for these months. For each month 
the household cannot provide the nec-
essary information to demonstrate its 
eligibility, the household shall be con-
sidered Ineligible. (3) For the months the household 
was eligible, the State agency shall 
calculate the allotment the household 
should have received. If the household 
received a smaller allotment than it 
was eligible to receive, the difference 
between the actual and correct allot-
ments equals the amount to be re-
stored. 
(4) If a claim against a household Is 
unpaid or held in suspense as provided 
in 1273.18. the amount to be restored 
shall be offset against the amount due 
on the claim before the balance, if 
any. Is restored to the household. At 
the point in time when the household 
is certified and receives an initial allot-
ment, the initial allotment shall not be 
reduced to offset claims, even if the 
Initial allotment is paid retroactively. 
(e) Lost benefits to individual* dis-Qualified for intentional Program vio-
lation. Individuals disqualified for In-
tentional Program violation are enti-
tled to restoration of any benefits lost 
during the months that they were dis-
qualified, not to exceed twelve months 
prior to the date of State agency noti-
fication, only if the decision which re-
sulted in disqualification is subse-
quently reversed. For example, an in-
dividual would not be entitled to resto-
ration of lost benefits for the period of 
disqualification based solely on the 
fact that a criminal conviction could 
not be obtained, unless the individual 
successfully challenged the disqualifi-
cation period imposed by an admlnis 
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tratlve disqualification In a separate 
court action. For each month the Indi-
vidual was disqualified, not to exceed 
twelve months prior to State agency 
notification, the amount to be re-
stored, if any, shall be determined by 
comparing the allotment the house-
hold received with the allotment the 
household would have received had 
the disqualified member been allowed 
to participate. If the household re-
ceived a smaller allotment than it 
should have received, the difference 
equals the amount to be restored. Par-
ticipation In an administrative dis-
qualification hearing in which the 
household contests the State agency 
assertion of intentional Program viola-
tion shall be considered notification 
that the household Is requesting re-
stored benefits. 
(f) Method of restoration. Regardless 
of whether a household is currently el-
igible or ineligible, the State agency 
shall restore lost benefits to a house-
hold by issuing an allotment equal to 
the amount of benefits that were lost. 
The amount restored shall be issued in 
addition to the allotment currently eli-
gible households are entitled to re-
ceive. The State agency shall honor 
reasonable requests by households to 
restore lost benefits in monthly in-
stallments if, for example, the house-
hold fears the excess coupons may be 
stolen, or that the amount to be re-
stored is more than it can use in a rea-
sonable period of time. 
(g) Changes in household composi-
tion. Whenever lost benefits are due a 
household and the household's mem-
bership has changed, the State agency 
shall restore the lost benefits to the 
household containing a majority of 
the individuals who were household 
members at the time the loss occurred. 
If the State agency cannot locate or 
determine the household which con-
tains a majority of household mem-
bers the State agency shall restore the 
lost benefits to the household contain-
ing the head of the household at the 
time the loss occurred. 
(h) Accounting procedures. Each 
State agency shall be responsible for 
maintaining an accounting system for 
tocumentlng a household's entitle-
nent to restoration of lost benefits 
tnd for recording the balance of lost 
§273.18 
benefits that must be restored to the 
household. Each State agency shall at 
a minimum, document how the 
amount to be restored was calculated 
and the reason lost benefits must be 
restored. The accounting system shall 
be designed to readily identify those 
situations where a claim against a 
household can be used to offset the 
amount to be restored. 
(1) Losses of benefits that occurred 
prior to elimination of the purchase 
requirement Households assigned a 
purchase requirement that was too 
high or assigned an incorrect house-
hold size shall be entitled to restora-
tion of lost benefits if the household 
received fewer bonus stamps as a 
result. The amount to be restored is 
equal to the difference between the 
bonus stamps the household received 
and the correct amount the household 
should have received. State agencies 
shall restore the lost benefits in ac-
cordance with the procedures outlined 
in this section. 
CAmdL 132. 43 FR 47889, Oct. 17. 1978. as 
amended by Amdt 225. 48 FR 16831. Apr. 
19. 1983; Amdt. 314. 54 FR 24518. June 7. 
1989) 
1273.18 *Ctaimr*r*!mt twwcHoJd*. -
(a) Establishing claims against 
households. All adult household mem-
bers shall be Jointly and severally 
liable for the value of any over is-
suance of benefits to the household. 
Th4» 8tat«. ag«iM .^>UaXl ^UO>^Ui. a 
claim against any iiousehold lhat has,, 
. received .more -food vstorop. ^benefits 
thatt It to entitled ttf recetve or any 
household which contains an adult 
member who, was .an. adult member of 
another household that received more 
food stamp benefits than it was entl-
• tied to r»o#ive.. -
(1) Inadvertent household error 
claims. A claim shall be handled as an 
inadvertent household error claim if 
the overissuance was caused by: 
(i) A misunderstanding or unintend-
ed error on the part of the household; 
<li) A misunderstanding or unintend-
ed error on the part of a categorically 
eligible household provided a claim 
can be calculated based on a change in 
net income and/or household size 
amount; 
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(lii) SSA action of failure to take 
action which resulted In the house-
hold's categorical eligibility provided a 
claim can be calculated based on a 
change in net income and/or house-
hold size. 
(2) Administrative error claim*. A 
claim shall be handled as an adminis-
trative error claim if the overlssuance 
was caused by State agency action or 
failure to take action or. in the case of 
categorical eligibility, an action by an 
agency of the State or local govern-
ment which resulted in the house-
hold's Improper eligibility for public 
assistance provided a claim can be cal-
culated based on a change in net 
Income and/or household size. 
(3) Intentional Program violation 
claims A claim shall be handled as an 
intentional Program violation claim 
only if an administrative disqualifica-
tion hearing official or a court of ap-
propriate Jurisdiction has determined 
that a household member committed 
intentional Program violation as de-
fined in 5 273.16(c). or an individual Is 
disqualified as a result of signing 
either a waiver of his/her disqualifica-
tion hearing as discussed in I 273.16(f) 
or a disqualification consent agree-
ment in cases referred for prosecution 
as discussed Ln f 273.16(h). Prior to the 
determination of intentional Program 
violation or the signing of either a 
waiver of right to a disqualification 
hearing or a disqualification consent 
agreement in cases of deferred adjudi-
cation, the claim against the house-
hold shall be handled as an inadvert-
ent household error claim. 
(b) Criteria /or establishing inad-
vertent household and administrative 
error claims. The State agency shall 
take action to establish a claim against 
any household that received an overls-
suance due to an Inadvertent house-
hold or administrative error If the cri-
teria specified in this paragraph have 
been met. At a minimum, the State 
agency shall take action on those 
claims for which 12 months or less 
have elasped between the month an 
overissuence occurred and the month 
the State agency discovered a specific 
cas« involving an overlssuance. The 
8tate agency may choose to take 
action on those claims for which more 
than 12 months have elasped. Howev-
er, the State agency shall not take 
action on claims for which more than 
six yeurs have elasped between the 
month an overlssuance occurred and 
the month the State agency discov-
ered a specific case involving an overls-
suance. 
(1) Instances of Inadvertent house-
hold error which may result In a claim 
Include, but are not limited to, the fol-
lowing: 
(I) The household unintentionally 
failed to provide the State agency with 
correct or complete Information; 
(ii) The household unintentionally 
failed to report to the State agency 
changes In Its household circum-
stances; or 
(ill) The household unintentionally 
received benefits or more benefits 
than It was entitled to receive pending 
a fair hearing decision because the 
household requested a continuation of 
benefits based on the mistaken belief 
that it was entitled to such benefits. 
(iv) The household was receiving 
food stamps solely because of categori-
cal eligibility and the household was 
subsequently determined Ineligible for 
PA and/or SSI at the time they re-
ceived It. 
(v) The SSA took an action or failed 
to take the appropriate action, which 
resulted In the household improperly 
receiving SSI. 
(3) Instances of administrative error 
which may result In a claim include, 
but are not limited to, the following: 
(i) A State agency failed to take 
prompt action on a change reported 
by the household; 
(ID A State agency Incorrectly com-
puted the household's income or de-
ductions, or otherwise assigned an in-
correct allotment; 
(III) A State agency Incorrectly 
issued duplicate ATP's to a household 
which were subsequently transacted; 
(Iv) The State agency continued to 
provide a household food stamp allot-
ments after its certification period had 
expired without benefit of a reapplies-
tion determination; or 
(v) The State agency failed to pro-
vide a household a reduced level of 
food stamp benefits because its public 
assistance grant changed. 
(vl) An agency of the State or local 
government took an action or failed to 
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take an appropriate action, which re-
sulted In the household Improperly re-
ceiving PA. 
(3) Neither an administrative error 
claim nor an Inadvertent household 
error claim shall be established If an 
overlssuance occurred as a result of 
the following: 
(I) A 8tate agency failed to insure 
that a household fulfilled the follow-
ing procedural requirements: 
(A) Signed the application form, 
(B) Completed a current work regis-
tration form, or 
(C) Was certified in the correct 
project area; 
(ii) The household transacted an ex-
pired ATP. unless the household al-
tered Its ATP. 
(c) Calculating the amount of 
claimj—<1) Inadvertent household and 
administrative error claims. (1) For 
each month that a household received 
an overlssuance due to an Inadvertent 
household or administrative error, the 
State agency shall determine the cor-
rect amount of food stamp benefits 
the household was entitled to receive. 
The amount of the inadvertent house-
hold or administrative error claim 
shall be calculated based, at a mini-
mum, on the amount of overlssuance 
which occurred during the 12 months 
preceding the date the overlssuance 
was discovered. The State agency may 
choose to calculate the amount of the 
dalm back to the month the inadvert-
ent household or administrative error 
occurred, regardless of the length of 
time that elapsed until the Inadvert-
ent household or administrative error 
was discovered. However, the State 
agency shall not Include in Its calcula-
tion any amount of the overlssuance 
which occurred In a month more than 
six years from the date the overls-
suance was discovered. In cases Involv-
ing reported changes, the State agency 
shall determine the month the overls-
suance initially occurred as follows: 
(A) If, due to an Inadvertent error 
on the part of the household, the 
household failed to report a change ln 
its circumstances within the required 
timeframes, the first month affected 
by the household's failure to report 
shall be the first month in which the 
fhange would have been effective had 
<t been timely reported. However, in 
no event shall the State agency deter-
mine as the first month In which the 
change would have been effective any 
month later than two months from 
the month in which the change in 
household circumstances occurred. 
(B) If the household timely reported 
a change, but the State agency did not 
act on the change within the required 
timeframes, the first month affected 
by the State's failure to act shall be 
the first month the State agency 
would have made the change effective 
had it timely acted. However. In no 
event shall the State agency deter-
mine as the first month in which the 
change would have been effective any 
month later than two months from 
the month in which the change in 
household circumstances occurred. If 
a notice of adverse action was required 
but was not provided, the State agency 
shall assume for the purpose of calcu-
lating the claim that the maximum 
advance notice period as provided in 
1273.13(a)(1) would have expired 
without the household requesting a 
fair hearing. 
(11) If the household received a 
larger allotment than It was entitled 
to receive, the State agency shall es-
tablish a claim against the household 
equal to the difference between the al-
lotment the household received and 
the allotment the household should 
have received. For categorically eligi-
ble households, a claim will only be de-
termined when it can be computed on 
the basis of changed household net 
income and/or household size. A claim 
shall not be established If there was 
not a change In net Income and/or 
household size. 
(ill) After calculating the amount of 
the Inadvertent household or adminis-
trative error claim, the State agency 
shall offset the amount of the claim 
against any amounts which have not 
yet been restored to the household in 
accordance with {273.17. The State 
agency shall then Initiate collection 
action for the remaining balance, if 
any. 
(2) Intentional Program violation 
claims. (I) For each month that a 
household received an overlssuance 
due to an act of intentional Program 
violation, the State agency shall deter-
mine the correct amount of food 
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stamp benefits, if any. the household 
was entitled to receive. The amount of 
the intentional Program violation 
claim shall be calculated back to the 
month the act of intentional Program 
violation occurred, regardless of the 
length of time that elapsed until the 
determination of intentional Program 
violation was made. However, the 
State agency shall not include in Its 
calculation any amount of the overls-
suance which occurred in a month 
more than six years from the date the 
overissuance was discovered. If the 
household member is determined to 
have committed intentional Program 
violation by intentionally falling to 
report a change in its household's cir-
cumstances, the first month affected 
by the household's failure to report 
shall be the first month in which the 
change would have been effective had 
It been reported. However, in no event 
shall the State agency determine as 
the first month In which the change 
would have been effective any month 
later than two months from the 
month in which the change in house-
hold circumstances occurred. 
(ii) If the household received a 
larger allotment than it was entitled 
to receive, the State agency shall es-
tablish a claim against the household 
equal to the difference between the al-
lotment the household received and 
the allotment the household should 
have received. When determining the 
amount of benefits the household 
should have received, the State agency 
shall not apply the 20 percent earned 
income deduction to that portion of 
earned income which the household 
intentionally failed to report. 
(iii) Once the amount of the inten-
tional Program violation claim is es-
tablished, the State agency shall 
offset the claim against any amount of 
lost benefits that have not yet been re-
stored to the household in accordance 
with § 273.17. 
<d) Collecting claims against house-
holds—< I) Criteria for initiating collec-
tion action on Inadvertent household 
and administrative error claims. 
(I) State agencies shall initiate col-
lection action against the household 
on all inadvertent household or ad-
ministrative error claims unless the 
claim is collected through offset or 
one of the following conditions apply: 
(A) The total amount of the claim is 
less than $35, and the claim cannot be 
recovered by reducing the household's 
allotment. However, any State agency 
shall have the option to initiate collec-
tion action for other claims under $35 
at such time that multiple overis 
suances for a household total $35 oi 
more. If the State agency chooses thb 
option, households shall be informed 
of this policy. 
(B) The State agency has documen-
tation which shows that the house-
hold cannot be located. 
(ii) The Slate agency may postpone 
collection action on Inadvertent house-
hold error claims in cases where an 
overissuance Is being referred for pos-
sible prosecution or for administrative 
disqualification, and the State agency 
determines that collection action will 
prejudice the case. 
(2) Criteria for initiating collection 
action on intentional Program viola' 
tion claims. If a household member is 
found to have committed intentional 
Program violation (by an administra-
tive disqualification hearing official or 
a court of appropriate jurisdiction) or 
has signed either a waiver as discussed 
in | 273.16(f) or a consent agreement 
as discussed in ft 273.16(h). the State 
agency shall initiate collection action 
against the individual's household. In 
addition, a personal contact with the 
household shall be made, if possible. 
The State agency shall initiate such 
collection unless the household has 
repaid the overissuance already, the 
State agency has documentation 
which shows the household cannot be 
located, or the State agency deter-
mines that collection action will preju-
dice the case against a household 
member referred for prosecution. The 
State agency shall initiate collection 
action for an unpaid or partially paid 
claim even if collection action was pre-
viously initiated against the household 
while the claim was being handled as 
an inadvertent household error claim. 
In cases where a household member 
was found guilty of misrepresentation 
of fraud by a court or signed a dis-
qualification consent agreement in 
cases referred for prosecution, the 
State agency shall request that the 
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matter of restitution be brought 
before the court or addressed in the 
agreement reached between the pros-
ecutor and accused individual. 
(3) Initiating collection on claims. 
(i) State agencies shall initiate collec-
tion action by providing the household 
t written demand letter which informs 
the household of the amount owed, 
the reason for the claim, the period of 
time the claim covers, any offsetting 
that was done to reduce the claim, 
how the household may pay the claim, 
and the household's right to a fair 
hearing IX the household disagrees 
with the amount of the claim, unless 
the household has already had a fair 
hearing on the amount of the claim as 
a result of consolidation of the admin-
istrative disqualification hearing with 
the fair hearing. If there is an Individ-
ual or organization available that pro-
vides free legal representation, the 
written demand letter shall also advise 
the household of the availability of 
the service. For inadvertent household 
error and Intentional Program viola-
tion claims, the household shall also 
be informed of the length of time the 
household has to decide which method 
of repayment it will choose and inform 
the State agency of its decision and of 
the fact that the household's allot-
ment will be reduced if the household 
falls to agree to make restitution. For 
administrative error claims, the house-
hold shall also be informed of the 
availability of allotment reduction as a 
method of repayment if the household 
prefers to use this method. In addi-
tion, any household against which the 
State agency has initiated collection 
action shall be informed of its right to 
request renegotiation of any repay-
ment schedule to which the household 
has agreed in accordance with para-
graph (g)(2) of this section should the 
household's economic circumstances 
change. The demand letter shall pro-
vide space for the household to indi-
cate the method of repayment and a 
signature block. 
(11) Each State agency shall develop 
a written demand letter for initiating 
collection action on claims which con-
tains the information required by this 
section. A model form letter for de-
manding restitution of an overissuance 
is available from FNS for adaptation 
by any State agency. 
(iii) If the household pays the claim, 
payments shall be accepted and sub-
mitted to FNS in accordance with the 
procedures outlined in paragraphs (g) 
and (h) of this section. 
(4) Action against households which 
fail to respond, (i) If the household 
against which collection action has 
been initiated for repayment of an in-
advertent household error or inten-
tional Program violation claim is cur-
rently participating in the program 
and does not respond to the written 
demand letter within 30 days of the 
date the notice is mailed, the State 
agency shall reduce the household's 
food stamp allotment. 
(Ii) If any nonparticipating house-
hold or if any currently participating 
household against which collection 
action has been Initiated for repay-
ment of an administrative error claim 
does not respond to the first demand 
letter, additional demand letters shall 
be sent at reasonable intervals, such as 
30 days, until the household has re-
sponded by paying or agreeing to pay 
the claim, until the criteria for sus-
pending collection action specified in 
paragraph (e) of this section have 
been met, or until the State agency 
Initiates other collection actions. 
(Iii) The State agency may also 
pursue other collection actions, as ap-
propriate, to obtain restitution of a 
claim against any household which 
fails to respond to a written demand! 
letter for repayment of any inadvert-
ent household error, administrative 
error, or intentional Program violation 
claim. If the State agency chooses to 
pursue other collection actions and 
the household pays the claim, pay-
ments shall be submitted to FNS in ac-
cordance with the procedures outlined 
in paragraph (h) of this section and 
the State agency's retention shall be 
based on the actual amount collected 
from the household through such col-
lection actions. 
(e) Suspending and terminating col-
lection of claims—(I) Suspending col-
lection of inadvertent household and 
administrative error claims. An inad-
vertent household or administrative 
error claim may be suspended if no 
collection action was Initiated because 
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of conditions specified In paragraph 
(dHlKl) of this section. If collection 
action was initiated, and at least one 
demand letter has been sent, further 
collection action of an Inadvertent 
household error claim against a non-
participating household or of any ad-
ministrative error claim may be sus-
pended when: 
(1) The household cannot be located; 
or 
<ii) The cost of further collection 
action Is likely to exceed the amount 
that can be recovered. 
(2) Suspending collection of inten-
tional Program violation claims. The 
State agency may suspend collection 
action on intentional Program viola-
tion claims at any time if It has docu-
mentation that the household cannot 
be located. If the State agency has 
sent at least one demand letter for 
claims under $100. at least two 
demand letters for claims between 
$100 and $400. and at least three 
demand letters for claims of more 
than $400. further collection action of 
any intentional Program violation 
claim against a nonparticipating 
household may be suspended when 
the cost of further collection action is 
likely to exceed the amount that can 
be recovered. 
(3) Terminating collection of claims, 
A claim may be determined uncollecti-
ble after it U held in suspense for 3 
years. The State agency may use a sus-
pended or terminated claim to offset 
benefits In accordance with I 273.17. 
(f) Change in household composi-
tion. State agencies shall Initiate col-
lection action against any or all of the 
adult members of a household at the 
time an overissuance occurred. There-
fore, if a change In household compo-
sition occurs. State agencies may 
pursue collection action against any 
household which has a member who 
was an adult member of the household 
that received the overissuance. The 
State agency may also offset the 
amount of the claim against restored 
benefits owed to any household which 
contains a member who was an adult 
member of the original household at 
the time the overissuance occurred. 
Under no circumstances may a State 
agency collect more than the amount 
of the claim. In pursuing claims, the 
State agency may use any of the ap-
propriate methods of collecting pay-
ments in | 273.18(g). 
(g) Method of collecting payments. 
As specified in paragraph (d) of this 
section. State agencies shall collect 
payments for claims against house-
holds as follows: 
(1) Lump sum. (I) If the household is 
financially able to pay the claim at 
one time, the State agency shall col-
lect a lump sum cash payment. Howev-
er, the household shall not be required 
to liquidate all of its resources to make 
this one lump sum payment. 
(li) If the household Is financially 
unable to pay the entire amount of 
the claim at one time and prefers to 
make a lump sum cash payment as 
partial payment of the claim, the 
State agency shall accept this method 
of payment. 
(ill) If the household chooses to 
make a lump sum payment of food 
stamp coupons as full or partial pay-
ment of the claim, the State agency 
shall accept this method of repay-
ment. 
(2) Installments, (i) The Stale 
agency shall negotiate a payment 
schedule with the household for re-
payment of any amounts of the claim 
not repaid through a lump sum pay-
ment. Payments shall be accepted by 
the State agency In regular install-
ments. The household may use food 
stamp coupons as full or partial pay-
ment of any installment. If the full 
claim or remaining amount of the 
claim cannot be liquidated in 3 years, 
the State agency may compromise the 
claim by reducing it to an amount thai 
will allow the household to pay the 
claim in 3 years. A State agency may 
use the full amount of the claim (in-
cluding any amount compromised) to 
offset benefits in accordance with 
§273.17. 
(ii) If the household falls to make a 
payment in accordance with the estab-
lished repayment schedule (either i 
lesser amount or no payment), the 
State agency shall send the household 
a notice explaining that no payment 
or an insufficient payment was re-
ceived. The notice shall inform the 
household that it may contact the 
State agency to discuss renegotiation 
of the payment schedule. The nou* 
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shall also inform the household that 
unless the overdue payments are made 
or the State agency is contacted to dis-
cuss renegotiation of the payment 
schedule, the allotment of a currently 
participating household against which 
an Inadvertent household error or in-
tentional Program violation claim has 
been established may be reduced with-
out a notice of adverse action. 
(iil) If the household responds to the 
notice, the State agency shall take one 
of the following actions as appropri-
ate: 
(A) If the household makes the over-
due payments and wishes to continue 
payments based on the previous sched-
ule, permit the household to do so; 
(B) If the household requests re-
negotiation, and If the State agency 
concurs with the request, negotiate a 
new payment schedule; 
(C) If the household requests re-
negotiation of the amount of its repay-
ment schedule but the State agency 
believes that the household's econom-
ic circumstances have not changed 
enough to warrant the requested set-
tlement, the State agency may contin-
ue renegotiation until a settlement can 
be reached. The State agency shall 
have the option to invoke allotment 
reduction against a currently partici-
pating household for repayment of an 
inadvertent household error or inten-
tional Program violation claim if a set-
dement cannot be reached. 
<lv) If a currently participating 
household against which an Inadvert-
ent household error or intentional 
Program violation claims has been es-
tablished fails to respond to the 
notice, the State agency shall Invoke 
allotment reduction. The State agency 
n»y also Invoke allotment reduction if 
wch a household responds by request-
wig renegotiation of the amount of its 
repayment schedule but the State 
•ttncy believes that the household's 
economic circumstances have not 
changed enough to warrant the re-
vested settlement. If allotment re-
duction is invoked, no notice of ad-
verse action is required. (v) In cases where the household is 
furrently participating in the program 
jnd » payment schedule is negotiated 
'or repayment of an inadvertent 
^o^nold error or intentional Pro-
gram violation claim, the State agency 
shall ensure that the negotiated 
amount to be repaid each month 
through installment payments is not 
less than the amount which could be 
recovered through allotment reduc-
tion. Once negotiated, the amount to 
be repaid each month through install-
ment payments shall remain un-
changed regardless of subsequent 
changes in the household's monthly 
allotment. However, both the State 
agency and the household shall have 
the option to initiate renegotiation of 
the payment schedule if they believe 
that the household's economic circum-
stances have changed enough to war-
rant such action. 
(3) Reduction in food stamp allot-
ment State agencies shall collect pay-
ments for inadvertent household error 
claims and Intentional Program viola-
tion claims from households currently 
participating in the program by reduc-
ing the household's food stamp allot-
ments. State agencies shall collect pay-
ments for administrative error claims 
from households currently participat-
ing in the program by reducing the 
household's food stamp allotments if 
the household prefers to use this 
method of repayment. Prior to reduc-
tion, the State agency shall inform the 
household of the appropriate formula 
for determining the amount of food 
stamps to be recovered each month 
and the effect of that formula on the 
household's allotment (i.e.. the 
amount of food stamps the State 
agency expects will be recovered each 
month), and of the availability of 
other methods of repayment. If the 
household requests to make a lump 
sum cash and/or food stamp coupon 
payment as full or partial payment of 
the claim, the State agency shall 
accept this method of payment. The 
State agency shall reduce the house-
hold's allotment to recover any 
amounts of an inadvertent household 
error or intentional Program violation 
claim not repaid through a lump sum 
cash and/or food stamp coupon pay-
ment, unless a payment schedule has 
been negotiated with the household. 
The provision for a $10 minimum ben-
efit level for households with one and 
two members only, as described in 
I 273.10(e)(2)(ii)(C). shall apply to the 
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allotment prior to reduction in accord-
ance with this paragraph. IX the full 
or remaining amount of the claim 
cannot be liquidated in 3 yean, the 
State agency may compromise the 
claim by reducing It to an amount that 
will allow the household to make resti-
tution within 3 years. A State agency 
may use the full amount of the claim 
(including any amount compromised) 
to offset benefits in accordance with 
ft. 273.17. The amount of food stamps 
to be recovered each month through 
allotment reduction shall be deter-
mined as follows: 
(i) Inadvertent household error 
claim*. For Inadvertent household 
error claims, the amount of food 
stamps shall be the greater of 10 per-
cent of the household's monthly allot-
ment or $10 per month. 
(U) Administrative error claims. For 
administrative error claims, the 
amount of food stamps to be recovered 
each month from a household choos-
ing to use this method shall be negoti-
ated with the household. Choice of 
this option Is entirely up to the house-
hold and no household shall have Its 
allotment reduced by an amount with 
which it does not agree for payment of 
an administrative error claim. 
(Ill) Intentional Program violation 
claims. For Intentional Program viola-
tion claims, the amount of food 
stamps shall be the greater of 20 per-
cent of the household's monthly enti-
tlement or $10 per month. 
(h) Submission of payments. (1) The 
State agency shall retain the value of 
funds collected for inadvertent house-
hold error. Intentional Program viola-
tion, or administrative error claims. 
This amount includes the total value 
of allotment reductions to collect 
claims, but does not include the value 
of benefits not issued as a result of a 
household member being disqualified. 
The States' letter of credit will be 
amended on a quarterly basis to re-
flect the States' retention of 25 per-
cent of the value of inadvertent house-
hold error claims collected and 50 per-
cent of the value of Intentional Pro-
gram violation claims collected, as well 
as full retention by PNS of all admin-
istrative error overissuance recoveries. 
(2) Each State agency shall submit 
quarterly a Form FNS-209. Status of 
7 CFRCh. II (1-1-90 Edition) 
Claims Against Households, to deuil 
the State's activities relating to claims 
against households. This report is due 
no later than 30 days after the end of 
each calendar year quarter and shall 
be submitted to FNS even if the State 
agency has not collected any pay. 
ments. In addition to reporting ihe 
amount of funds recovered from Inad 
vertent household error and Intention-
al Program violation claims each quar-
ter on Form FNS-209, the Stale 
agency shall also report these amounu 
on other letter of credit documents at 
required. In accounting for inadvert-
ent household error and intentional 
Program violation claims collections, 
the State agency shall Include cash or 
coupon repayments and the value o( 
allotments recovered or offset by res-
toration of lost benefits. However, the 
value of benefits not Issued during pe-
riods of disqualification shall not be 
considered recovered allotments and 
shall not be used to offset an Inten-
tional Program violation claim. In ad-
dition, each State agency shall estab-
lish controls to ensure that officials 
responsible for intentional Program 
violation determinations will not bene-
fit from the State Bhare of recoveries. 
(3) The State agency may retain any 
amounts recovered on a claim being 
handled as an inadvertent household 
error claim prior to obtaining a deter-
mination by an administrative dis-
qualification hearing offical or a court 
of appropriate jurisdiction that inten-
tional Program violation was commit-
ted, or receiving from an Individual 
either a signed waiver or consent 
agreement, at the rate applicable U> 
intentional Program violation claims, 
once the determination or signed doc-
ument is obtained. In such cases, the 
State agency shall include a note in an 
attachment to the quarterly reporting 
form specified In paragraph (hX2) o( 
this section which shows the addition-
al amounts being retained on amounu 
already recovered as a result of the 
change in status of the claim. 
(4) If a household has overpaid t 
claim, the State agency shall pay the 
household any amounts overpaid as 
soon as possible after the overpayment 
becomes known. The household shall 
be paid by whatever method the State 
agency deems appropriate considering 
Food end Nutrition Service, USDA 
the household's circumstances. Over-
paid amounts of a claim which have 
previously been reported as collected 
via the FNS-209 and which have been 
repaid to the household shall be re-
ported In the appropriate column on 
ihe FNS-209 for the quarter In which 
the repayment occurred. The amount 
of the repayment shall be subtracted 
[rom the total amount collected. The 
appropriate retention rate shall be ap-
plied to the reduced collection total. 
(5) In cases where FNS has billed a 
Stale agency for negligence, any 
imounts collected from households 
ihich were caused by the State's neg-
ligence will be credited by FNS. When 
lubmitting these payments, the State 
tgency shall include a note as an at-
tachment to the quarterly reporting 
form specified in paragraph (hX2) of 
[his section which shows the amount 
[hat should be credited against the 
Stales bill. 
(i) Returned coupons. If coupon 
woks collected from households as 
payment for claims are returned Intact 
ind in usable form, the State agency 
nay return them to coupon inventory. 
The State agency shall destroy any 
roupons or coupon books which are 
lot returned to inventory in accord-
mce with the procedures outlined in 
1274.7(f). 
(J) Claims discharged through bank-
itptcy. State agencies shall act on 
Khalf of, and as, FNS In any bank-
'uptcy proceeding against bankrupt 
louseholds owing food stamp claims. 
State agencies shall possess any rights. 
>rioritles. interests, liens or privileges, 
Lnd shall participate in any dlstribu-
ion of assets, to the same extent as 
FNS. Acting as FNS. State agencies 
jhall have the power and authority to 
He objections to discharge, proofs of 
laims, exceptions to discharge, peti-
ions for revocation of discharge, and 
uiy other documents, motions or ob-
jections which FNS might have filed. 
toy amounts collected under this au-
horlty shall be transmitted to FNS as 
irovided in paragraph (h) of this sec-
ion. 
(k) Accounting procedures. Each 
>ute agency shall be responsible for 
remaining an accounting system for 
nonitoring claims against households. 
It * minimum, the accounting system 
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shall be designed to readily accom-
plish the following: 
(1) Document the circumstances 
which resulted In a claim, the proce-
dures used to calculate the claim, the 
methods, used to collect the claim and. 
If applicable, the circumstances which 
resulted in suspension or termination 
of collection action. 
(2) Identify those situations in 
which an amount not yet restored to a 
household can be used to offset a 
claim owed by the household. 
(3) Identify those households that 
have failed to make installment pay-
ments on their claims. 
(4) Document how much money was 
collected In payment of a claim and 
how much was submitted to FNS. 
(1) Interstate claims collection. In 
cases where a household moves out of 
the area under a State agency's Juris-
diction, the State agency should initi-
ate or continue collection action 
against the household for any overis-
suance to the household which oc-
curred while it was under the State 
agency's jurisdiction. The State 
agency which overissued benefits to 
the household shall have the first op-
portunity to collect any overissuance. 
However, If the State agency which 
overissued benefits to the household 
does not take prompt action to collect, 
then the State agency which adminis-
ters the area into which the household 
moves should Initiate action to collect 
the overissuance. Prior to initiating 
action to collect such over issuances, 
the State agency which administers 
the area into which the household 
moves shall contact the State agency 
which overissued benefits to ascertain 
that it does not intend to pursue 
prompt collection. The State share of 
any collected claims, as provided in 
§ 273.18(h). shall be retained by the 
State agency which collects the overis-
suance. 
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